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Hall, Jeffrey C. The Stand of the US Army at Gettysburg. Indiana University
Press, $49.95 ISBN 253342589
This review is also available under the following title: Gettysburg: The
Meade-Sickles ControversySeparate strategies
Scholar compares diverse approaches to analyzing battle
This year being the 140th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, several
new books on the battle are being published. Two of them are Gettysburg: The
Meade-Sickles Controversy, by Richard A. Sauers, and The Stand of the
Union Army at Gettysburg, by Jeffrey C. Hall. The two books, and the two
authors, are very different. Sauers's book focuses on an important but narrow
aspect of the battle, whereas Hall's addresses the entire battle and campaign.
Sauers is a professional historian; Hall is a biologist whose fascination with
Gettysburg has led him to teach a regular class on the battle at Brandeis
University.
Sauers has written four previous books on the Civil War, including A
Caspian Sea of Ink: The Meade-Sickles Controversy in 1989. His present book
may be considered the last word on the subject.
On the second day of the battle, Gen. Daniel Sickles advanced his Third
Corps a half mile forward of the position of the general line of the Army of the
Potomac along Cemetery Ridge. The attack by Longstreet and Hill's Corps of the
Army of Northern Virginia upon the Union left flank therefore fell on Sickles's
corps. Defending the now-famous Peach Orchard, Wheatfield, and Devil's Den,
the Third Corps resisted valiantly along a line too long for the number of troops
in the corps, but was chewed up by Confederate assaults. The most famous of
those assaults was upon Little Round Top, which had been exposed by Sickles's
advance, and which was rescued for the Union cause by troops from the Fifth
Corps. Sickles's advanced line was bolstered by reinforcements and
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counterattacks by elements of the Second and Fifth corps, but the piecemeal
nature of their arrival assured that large numbers of Union troops would become
casualties. But also assured was the wearing out and repulse of the Confederate
offensive along the whole line except in and around Devil's Den.
The Meade-Sickles controversy revolves around two questions: Did Sickles
disobey his orders by moving his corps; and did the move turn out to be
beneficial for the Union army? Sickles claimed that his corps absorbed the
Confederate attack, causing it to run out of steam before it reached the Cemetery
Ridge line. In fact, when asked why there was no monument to Sickles at
Gettysburg, the old general replied, The whole damn battlefield is my
monument. Others have not been so sure that Sickles was the Savior of
Gettysburg, but maintain instead that his insubordination not only brought about
excessive casualties but nearly led to disaster for the Army of the Potomac.
Sickles was not a professional soldier, but was a politician whose unsavory
personal behavior guaranteed his being involved in controversy. About two
months before Gettysburg, Sickles was ordered to abandon some high ground
around Chancellorsville. Upon his doing so, Gen. Robert E. Lee's artillerists
occupied the high ground and subjected the center of the Union line to
destructive fire. Now, at Gettysburg, Sickles looked forward from the position
assigned his corps along the lower end of Cemetery Ridge, and saw that a peach
orchard along the Emmitsburg Road was considerably higher than his own
position. Wanting to avoid another Chancellorsville, Sickles moved forward,
even though he had no orders to do so. The new line was 50% longer than the
line he had been assigned, and his move uncovered the left anchor of the Union
line at Little Round Top. Later, Sickles claimed that he had received no orders
from Meade, and also that his idea had been to defend Little Round Top from a
position forward of it (Devil's Den).
Sauers assembles what appears to be all possible evidence on all sides of the 
controversy (with the egregious exception of the essay The Chances of War in 
The Gettysburg Nobody Knows, ed. by Gabor S. Boritt, by an author whose 
name modesty forbids me to mention.) Not only is the evidence thorough; 
Sauers's conclusions are persuasive. Sauers shows clearly that Maj. Gen. George 
Gordon Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, gave specific and 
clear orders to Sickles to position his corps along lower Cemetery Ridge and 
man Little Round Top, and he communicated the order to Sickles several times. 
Sickles's claim not to have received specific orders is shown to have been a lie û
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not necessarily unexpected from a man who was the first to claim temporary
insanity in an American trial (Sickles shot a man for dallying with his wife), was
the first to be acquitted on those grounds, and after the trial was said to have
boasted, I meant to kill him.
Secondly, Sauers shows that Sickles's movement forward had not been to
the Union army's advantage. Citing General Humphreys (an excellent and
reliable soldier) on page 135, Sauers summarizes Humphrey's conclusions
regarding the error in Sickles's advance: the Cemetery Ridge line was a better
defensive position than the Peach Orchard line, the Peach Orchard's prominence
was a glaring weakness in the new position, Sickles did not have enough men to
defend the line he chose, and the new position was too far from the rest of the
army to be supported efficiently.
Gettysburg: The Meade-Sickles Controversy follows the postwar
arguments posited by both sides; it also deals with Sickles's claim that his move
prevented Meade from ordering the Army of the Potomac to retreat. In refuting
the latter red herring, Sauers properly defends Meade as being not only
competent, but courageous, decisive, and determined.Sauers's text is a satisfying
book in that it seizes a specific issue, thoroughly lays out the evidence, and
draws clear, definite, and well-argued conclusions. Some readers will find
themselves somewhat annoyed by what becomes almost a refrain of
disparagement of previous historians, beginning on the first page of the book, for
their shoddy scholarship regarding this issue. These comments continue to the
very last page of the book. Perhaps the denunciations should have been reserved
solely for Sickles instead, the self-aggrandizing insubordinate who claimed I
simply advanced out on to the battlefield and seized Longstreet by the throat and
held him there, and who was not above lying nor above trying to trash the
reputation of a decent and effective commanding general in order save his own.
A much larger book, covering a much larger subject, is Hall's The Stand of 
the Union Army at Gettysburg. That Dr. Hall is a scientist by training and not 
a historian is not necessarily a bad thing, as some of the more effective writers of 
Civil War history have been non-professionals; moreover, Hall's scientific mind 
enables him to approach the subject with clarity of thought and a merciless 
orderliness reflected in 168 maps and 115 charts. Indeed, the maps and charts are 
what first strike the reader. The book is presented in an enlarged, coffee-table 
size to accommodate the extraordinary profusion of cartographic visuals. Hall 
wants readers to be very clear about which units were a part of which
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organizations, where and how they were positioned, and where they moved. The
focus of this text ranges from the macroscopic to the minute. Obviously, this is a
strength of the book; it is exactly the kind of thing that Civil War students (who
write and read reviews of Civil War books) want. However, such graphic detail
is not for everybody, so one also must focus on the text of The Stand.
The text offers several appreciable strengths. One is that we finally have a
book whose purpose is not to analyze Confederate mistakes as a way of
understanding the battle. Hall writes on page xix that . . . Gettysburg was a battle
that was not sitting there for the Confederates to win or lose. . . .The Southerners
did not flounder at Gettysburg; they were outfought. Probably the best brief
analysis of the battle was given by one of the most qualified persons for making
such an analysis: General George Pickett. When asked why the Army of
Northern Virginia lost the battle, the general said that he thought the Yankees
had had something to do with it. It is time that we have a book which creates an
argument in support of Pickett's conclusion.
While such a thesis will raise the blood pressure of Southern sympathizers,
it is difficult to resist Hall's conclusion, especially in the best section of his book,
the description of Pickett's Charge. Hall shows that, first of all, the charge was
not a desperate, ad hoc affair; it had a chance of succeeding. On July 3, hours
were devoted to careful planning and dispositions. Avoiding high ground and the
visibility it entailed, Longstreet, Pickett, and others divided the roughly 13,000
men into two wings û one placed behind the ridge line, in the trees, directly
across from the objective point of the attack: the famous Copse of Trees (which
Hall tells us, interestingly, contained at least 200 trees at the time of the battle.)
Pickett's Division was quietly placed much closer to Union lines: very near the
Emmitsburg Road, hidden in a long depression. However, these men were far
south of the Copse of Trees, and in order to arrive there at the same time as
Pettigrew's and Trimble's men, the Virginians had to march to their left, face
front, then face left, several times. This called for both precision and courage.
Although Hall tells us that many of the rebels turned back, the carefully planned
advance produced the desired result of an overwhelming force at a narrow point
of penetration.
It was an active Union defense that not only repelled, but shattered the 
charge. Rather than passively awaiting the shock of encounter, Union units on 
both flanks of Pickett's long lines moved forward, enveloped the attackers, and 
enfiladed their lines, not only decimating many Confederate units but forcing the
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rebel advance to funnel into a disorganized crowd. Then the small penetration
achieved by the Confederates was promptly and vigorously counterattacked.
Battlefield guides have long given visitors a justifiably admiring picture of the
courage of Pickett's men; now perhaps the even greater courage of the relatively
few Union defenders who stood their ground in front of the Copse of Trees will
also be given its due.
In this reviewer's opinion, the best single piece of writing and argument in
the book is the appendix dealing with the lethality of Civil War small arms. Hall
argues persuasively that the standard explanation of high casualties is wrong û
namely, that Civil War officers stupidly followed outdated Napoleonic tactics
after the invention of the rifled musket and minnie ball, which could inflict
casualties at much greater distance and with more accuracy than could the old
smoothbore and ball. Someone previous to Dr. Hall should have pointed out that
losses in the Napoleonic wars were not less than losses in the Civil War. But the
main argument made in Hall's appendix is concerned with the difference
between the theoretical accuracy and the battlefield accuracy of weapons that
had to be sighted, loaded in a cumbersome way, and fired with insensitive
triggers. This is an important appendix.
On the less than positive side, this reviewer awaits a second edition of the
book. Many readers will find the first two-thirds of the text to be unpleasantly
abstract in a game-board sense, and will get punchy from the many maps. While
Dr. Hall tells readers at the outset that the book will be a narrative, it is less a
narrative of the battle than a highly detailed diagram of the battle. Most of the
really interesting narrative details lie in the endnotes. As writing teachers are
fond of saying, a narrative must show, not tell. In another edition, perhaps much
of the endnote material will be brought forward into the text. Writing teachers
also tell you, don't talk about what you are writing, just write it. At some points it
feels like the subject of the book is the book itself, rather than the battle, with too
many references to what has been said, and what will be said. Finally, a second
edition will improve the book stylistically. Those interested in the story of
Gettysburg will be more satisfied with Stephen Sears's new Gettysburg.
But Hall's careful research and diagramming will continue to be an excellent
reference for a long time to come, and perhaps it will also correct something
more important than erroneous details of troop movements: the point of view
which says that the battle of Gettysburg was lost by the Confederates, rather than
won by the Union Army.
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Kent Gramm is Program Director for the Seminary Ridge Historical
Preservation Foundation in Gettysburg and teaches as Wheaton College (IL).
He is the author of Gettysburg: A Meditation on War and Values, November:
Lincoln's Elegy at Gettysburg and Somebody's Darling: Essays on the Civil War.
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